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THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ON THIN AIR,
MICHIGAN V. EPA: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATIONS ON REMAND
WITHOUT VACATUR
Laura H. Sheely*
I. INTRODUCTION

"It rests on thin air."I This was Judge Raymond Randolph's appraisal of
his colleagues' decision in Checkosky v. Securities and Exchange Commission, a

decision that remanded a federal agency ruling without vacating it.2 Judge
Randolph's instinct was right: remand without vacatur is questionable under the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act3 and creates a storm of uncertainty for
industries bound by agency regulations. Yet the United States Supreme Court
continues to use this method in its judicial review of administrative rulemaking. 4
And so it is fitting to appraise this issue in light of the Court's recent remand
without vacatur of the Environmental Protection Agency's Mercury and Air
Toxics Standards ("MATS") in Michigan v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency. 5

On February 16, 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
promulgated the MATS to require coal- and oil-fired power plants to reduce
mercury, acid gases, and particulate matter emissions. 6 The MATS required
existing power plants to comply with strict emission limits by April 15, 2015.7
As this deadline approached, many power plants had already invested millions
before the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in March 2015.8 The Supreme
Court ruled on July 29, 2015, that EPA unreasonably failed to consider costs in
its threshold decision that regulating hazardous air pollutants under § 7412 of the

* Laura is a J.D. Candidate at Mississippi College School of Law and a registered Professional
Engineer in the State of Mississippi. I dedicate this Note to my son Robert, my constant source of inspiration.
I would like to thank Professor Donald E. Campbell for his review and insightful comments on drafts of this
note. Finally, I express much gratitude to John E. Milner and Susan Floyd King who were instrumental in my
transition to law school. Your gift to me has been courage.

1. Checkosky v. SEC (In re Checkosky), 23 F.3d 452, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Randolph, J., separate
opinion).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id. at 454 (per curiam).
See id. at 467, 491 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1988)).
See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
Id.

6. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, IndustrialCommercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, Final Rule,

77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63) [hereinafter Final Rule]
(citing Clean Air Act § 112(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006)).
7. Id. at 9465.
8. SCOTUSblog, Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, (February 15, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/michigan-v-environmental-protection-agency/.
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Clean Air Act was "appropriate and necessary." 9 In invalidating EPA's
threshold decision, the Michigan Court called for the agency "to engage in
'reasoned decisionmaking"'o and cast an air of uncertainty over the future of the
MATS by remanding the standard without vacatur. With no clear legal guidance
for rules under remand without vacatur, power plants had little choice but to
continue to work toward compliance while remaining aware that they may have
been compelled to do so under an illegal rule.11
EPA deemed the Supreme Court's ruling in Michigan a "very narrow" 1 2
decision, one that in EPA's own words had "already taken effect."1 3 In remarks
made the day after the Michigan ruling, EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy
stated that "nothing has been vacated, the rule still stands," and this is "not a setback, it's an extra step."' 4 But contrary to EPA's response, the Michigan
decision has important implications regarding when and how the agency must
consider costs before developing regulatory directives that require industries to
make significant capital investments in emission-control equipment. Moreover,
Michigan follows other recent Supreme Court decisions that reflect the Court's
tougher stance on deference to expert agency interpretations of ambiguous
statues under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 15 the foundation for judicial deference to administrative agency
rulemaking.1 6 This posture may lead to increased use of remand without
vacatur.
This Note will critically assess a gap that exists in courts' analysis of
regulations on remand without vacatur: the courts' failure to consider the
burdens imposed on the regulated community in complying with regulations
under judicial review with uncertain outcomes. 17 Part II summarizes the facts
and procedural history of the MATS. Part III provides a background and history
of EPA rulemaking actions to regulate power plant emissions of hazardous air
pollutants ("HAPs"). Part IV discusses the instant case in which the Court
faulted EPA for ignoring costs in its threshold decision to regulate. Finally, Part
V argues that the Michigan decision signals an ongoing shift in judicial review
of EPA rulemaking. Michigan continues the erosion of Chevron deference,
holds that it is no longer acceptable to ignore the costs of expansive regulations,
9. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2711-12.
10. Id. at 2706 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)).
11. See Charles Weliand, Jennifer M. Hayes, and Meghan Sweeney, After Michigan v. EPA, High
Court Less Swayed by Chevron, LAW 360, (July 10, 2015), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/677500/aftermichigan-v-epa-high-court-less-swayed-by-chevron.
12. Janet McCabe, In Perspective: the Supreme Court's Mercury and Air Toxics Rule Decision, OUR
PLANET, OUR HOME: EPA'S BLOG ABOUT OUR WORLD, (June 30, 2015), http://blog.epa.gov/blog/2015/06/inperspective-the-supreme-courts-mercury-and-air-toxics-rule-decision/.
13. Anthony Lacey, Supreme Court Ruling Prolongs Uncertainty Over Fate of EPA Utility MACT,
INSIDE EPA, (July 3, 2015) (quoting statement of EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy).
14. Id.
15. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
16. E.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 512 (1989).
17. See Brian S. Prestes, Remanding Without Vacating Agency Action, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 108,
108 (2001).
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and shows the need for a stay of compliance deadlines so that affected industries
can temper the impacts of potentially unlawful rulemaking.
As a result, EPA should allow more time for compliance with regulations
under remand without vacatur -- equivalent at least to the length of the review
period after remand -- particularly when such regulations call for an industry to
make significant investments. In fact, the Supreme Court took note of power
plants' burdens of complying with another regulation: new existing source
performance standards, which have been challenged in the D.C. Circuit.1 8
There the Court responded by issuing a stay of the Clean Power Plan
("CPP") in order to avoid an outcome similar to that of Michigan.19
With this mind, even though power plants have already invested millions in
emission control equipment in anticipation of the MATS deadline, 2 0 the Court's
decision in Michigan is not moot. On the contrary, Michigan highlights the need
for a more consistent treatment of regulations on remand without vacatur and
shows the importance of considering the costs of compliance. As a result of
continuing uncertainty over the MATS, Michigan matters to the regulated
community and the rate-paying public.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Factual Summary ofEPA's Decision to Regulate

The Clean Air Act's statutory scheme for regulating hazardous air
pollutants ("HAPs") from coal- and oil-fired electric generating units ("power
plants") is "unique" compared to all other stationary HAP sources. 2 1 Because
power plants were already subject to extensive regulation under other Clean Air
Act provisions, Congress chose to treat power plants differently. 2 2 And so,
unlike the general scheme that automatically regulated all other major stationary
HAP sources, 23 Congress directed EPA to decide whether it was "appropriate
18. West Virginia v. E.P.A., 136 S.Ct. 1000, *1 (2016) (mem.).
19. West Virginia v. E.P.A., No. 15A773, 2016 WL 502947, at *1 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016).
Following the Supreme Court's holding in Michigan, the D.C. Circuit remanded the MATS to EPA and denied
State and industry's motions to stay implementation of MATS during EPA's reconsideration of costs. White

Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 12-1100, 2015 WL 11051103, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15,
2015), cert. denied sub nom. Michigan v. E.P.A., No. 15-1152, 2016 WL 1046833 (U.S. June 13, 2016). Upon
remand, the EPA issued a finding that consideration of costs did not affect the agency's determination that it is
appropriate and necessary to regulate HAP emissions from power plants. Supplemental Finding That It Is
Appropriate and Necessary To Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility

Steam Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,420 (April 25, 2016). Ultimately, on June 13, 2016, the
Supreme Court denied a petition from twenty States to stay or enjoin the MATS while the EPA conducts its
required cost analysis. Stuart Parker, High Court Denies Utility MACT Suit But Further Appeal Remains
Possible, INSIDE EPA June 13, 2016. The MATS remains in place as of the publication date of this note.
20. Michael B. Gerrard, Supreme Court Ruling on Mercury Shows Little Deference to EPA, NEW YORK
LAW JOURNAL (ONLINE), (Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202736720746/SupremeCourt-Ruling-on-Mercury-Shows-Little-Deference-to-EPA?sreturn=20160513010251.

21. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704-05 (2015).
22. Id.
23. A "major" source is one that emits more than ten tons per year of a single HAP or more than

twenty-five tons per year of any combination of HAPs. 44 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2012). EPA must list and
regulate major sources. Id. § 7412(c)(1)-(2).
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and necessary" to regulate power plant HAP emissions before subjecting them to
regulation under § 7412.24
To guide this determination, Congress directed EPA to "perform a study of
the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of [HAP]
emissions by [power plants]." 25 EPA completed the study 2 6 in February 1998
and published its decision to regulate power plants pursuant to the Utility RTC in
December 2000.27 In its threshold decision to regulate, EPA did not consider
costs and said only that regulation was "appropriate" because mercury is a public
health hazard, power plants are the most significant domestic mercury sources,
and mercury emission control technologies are now available. 28 Separately,
EPA said that regulation was "necessary" because other Clean Air Act
requirements had not adequately controlled mercury levels in the environment
and their ensuing health risks. 2 9
EPA's subsequent Regulatory Impact Analysis ("RIA") "played no role" in
its decision to regulate. 30 The RIA estimated that the Final Rule would cost
power plants $9.6 billion per year but would yield direct benefits attributable to
HAP emissions of only $4 to $6 million per year. 3 1 The RIA also included an
estimate of ancillary benefits 32 of $37 to $90 billion per year, predominately
from anticipated ancillary reductions of non-HAP pollutants. 33 Nevertheless,
34
EPA maintained that the statutory language "appropriate" was ambiguous.

Thence it was in the agency's discretion to interpret the term so as not to require
consideration of a power plant's compliance costs in its threshold decision that
regulation was "appropriate and necessary."

35

24. §7412(n)(1)(A).
25. Id.
26. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Study of Hazardous Air PollutantEmissions from Electric
Utility Steam Generating Units-FinalReport to Congress, EPA-453/R-98-004a (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Utility
RTC], http://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/combust/utiltox/eurtcl.pdf.
27. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Air Pollutants from Electric Steam Generating Units, 65

Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000) [hereinafter Regulatory Finding].
28. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705 (2015) (citing Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9326, 9363).
29. Id. (citing Final Rule, supra note 6, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9363).
30. Brief for the Federal Respondents at *14, Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 1449) (citing National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, IndustrialCommercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg.

9304-01, 9323 (Feb. 16, 2012)).
31. Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, EPA REPORT No.

EPA-452/R-1 1-011,

ES-1

(Dec.

2011),

http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf

[hereinafter RIA] (last visited Jan. 30, 2016).
32. Michigan, 135 S Ct. at 2706 (noting that ancillary or co-benefits consist of commensurate
reductions of sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, and other substances that are not hazardous air pollutants).

33. Id. (citing Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9306).
34. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 30, at 11 (citing National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-

Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 24976-01, 24,989 (May 3, 2011)).
35. Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 30, at 17 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A)).
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B. ProceduralHistory in the Court ofAppeals for the D.C. Circuit
After EPA published its Regulatory Finding that it was "appropriate and
necessary" to regulate HAP emissions from power plants, 3 6 the agency
promulgated the MATS in February 2012,37 setting national HAP emission
standards for six subcategories of power plants. 38 In response, several state,
industry, and labor group petitioners challenged the Final Rule in the D.C.
Circuit. 39 After consolidating the petitions as White Stallion Energy Center.
LLC. v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit ruled that EPA reasonably concluded that it did
not need to consider costs in making its initial "appropriate and necessary"
determination and denied the consolidated petitions. 4 0
C. Supreme CourtDisposition
The United States Supreme Court granted the consolidated states' and
industries' petitions for certiorari 41 to examine whether EPA unreasonably
"refuse[d] to consider cost" when it decided that it was "appropriate and
necessary" to regulate power plant HAPs. 4 2 Justice Scalia, writing for the 5-4
majority, 43 held that EPA acted "unreasonably" when it deemed compliance
costs, calculated to be 1,600 to 2,400 times greater than the direct benefits,
"irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants." 44 The central theme in
Justice Scalia's reasoning was that the deference afforded to federal
administrative agencies, known as Chevron deference, 45 requires agencies to
"operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation." 46 But EPA "strayed far
beyond those bounds" when it interpreted "appropriate and necessary" as
authorization to ignore costs in its threshold decision to regulate power plants. 47

36. Regulatory Finding, supra note 27, at 79,825.
37. Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9327 (stating that "it is reasonable to [make the listing decision] without
considering costs").
38. Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9367-68. The Final Rule established emission limitations for six
subcategories of power plants: (1) coal-fired unit not low rank virgin coal, (2) coal-fired unit designed low rank

virgin coal, (3) IGCC unit, (4) liquid oil-fired unit-continental, (5) liquid oil-fired unit-non-continental, and (6)
solid oil-derived fuel-fired unit.

39. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1229 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83
U.S.L.W. 3326 (U.S. Nov. 25, 2014) (No. 14-46).
40. Id. at 1241.
41. The Court consolidated the petitioner parties consisting of Michigan (No. 14-46) along with United
Air Regulatory Group (No. 14-47), National Mining Association (No. 14-14), and 23 other state petitioners.
The Court also consolidated the respondent parties consisting of the Environmental Protection Agency along
with 26 environmental groups and states.

42. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015).
43. Chief Justice Roberts along with Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito joined the majority opinion.

44. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706, 2712 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 2707 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)) (noting that, under Chevron, a court will accept an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statutory
provision as long as it is "reasonable"); see infra text accompanying note 70.

46. Id. (quoting United Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014)).
47. See id. (citing Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1) (2012)).
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Authoring the dissent, Justice Kagan 4 8 echoed the majority's premise that
regulating power plants "would be unreasonable if '[t]he Agency gave cost no
thought at all.' 49 But instead of requiring cost considerations as part of the
threshold decision to regulate, the dissenting justices praised EPA for including
costs later in the process of establishing emission limits. 50 Further, by adding
the value of ancillary benefits 5 1 developed in the RIA, Justice Kagan estimated
that the total health benefits would exceed industry's compliance costs by three
to nine times. 52
Ultimately, the Court's ruling (1) reversed the D.C. Circuit's decision, (2)
held that EPA improperly interpreted "appropriate" to exclude consideration of
costs in its threshold decision to regulate power plants, and (3) remanded without
vacating the Final Rule to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings consistent
with the majority opinion. 53
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
The Supreme Court's decision in Michigan involved judicial review of
EPA's rulemaking procedure under § 7412(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act. 5 4 The
decision rested on the doctrine of Chevron deference 5 5 and the evolving debate
over how much deference to allow an agency engaged in interpretation of an
ambiguous statute. 5 6 In its original form, § 7412 of the Clean Air Act of 1970
directed EPA to publish and periodically revise a list of substances determined to
be HAPS 57 and subsequently promulgate categorical National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants ("NESHAPs") for HAP sources within
360 days of their listing.5 8 Frustrated with this slow progress, 59 Congress
directed EPA to regulate major and area sources of such HAPs-but Congress
set separate provisions for regulating power plants. 6 0

48. Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined the dissenting opinion.
49. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting

Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706 (majority opinion)).
50. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
51. See supra note 32 for explanation of ancillary benefits.

52.
53.
54.
55.

See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2721-22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2712 (majority opinion).
See id. at 2705.
Id. at 2706 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43).

56. See infra text accompanying notes 210-15.
57. § 7412(a)(6) (defining "hazardous air pollutant" as "any air pollutant" that is included on the list of
pollutants in § 7412(b)); see also, SUSAN L. SMITH, SCOTT B. SAULS & ERNEST LANNET, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 17.06[2][a] (2016) (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2016) (noting that Congress included a
list of HAPs in the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments).
58. § 7412(b)(a)(A); see also, SUSAN L. SMITH, SCOTT B. SAULS & ERNEST LANNET, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 17.06[1][a][i] (noting that in the twenty years that followed passage of the 1970 Act,
EPA had listed only eight HAPs and developed emission standards for seven of the eight).

59. S. Rep. No. 101-228, at 3513 (1989) (stating that "[t]he law has worked poorly").
60. § 7412(a)(8). Electric Generating Units (referred to herein as "power plants") are defined as "any
fossil fuel fired combination unit of more than 25 megawatts that serves a generator that produces electricity
for sale."
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At the time of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress recognized
that power plants were already subject to multiple regulatory requirements such
as the Act's acid rain provisions. 6 1 Aware that acid-reducing equipment may
have a bonus effect of concurrently reducing HAP emissions, Congress adopted
a "wait and see" approach in the statutory scheme for power plants. 62 Because
the effects of such programs were undetermined at the time of the 1990
amendments, Congress wrote a unique provision allowing regulation of power
plant HAP emissions only if EPA finds such regulation "appropriate and
necessary" after completion of additional studies. 63
Thus, the language of § 7412(n)(1)(A) established a process for regulating
power plant HAPs that is different from the automatic process applied to other
categories of stationary sources. 64 This language predicated regulation upon the
results of the Utility RTC, a "study of hazards to the public reasonably
anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility steam generating
units." 65 Congress directed EPA to complete the Utility RTC 66 within three
years after the passage of the 1990 amendments and to regulate power plants
only if it "finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the
results." 67 If EPA made such a decision, regulation of power plants would
follow the same process as other stationary HAP sources. 68 In this case, the
process required development of a Maximum Achievable Control Technology
("MACT") for coal- and oil-fired power plants, commonly referred to as the
Mercury and Air Toxics Standard ("MATS"). 69

61. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2715-16 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Clean Air
Act's acid rain provisions required power plants to install equipment to reduce their emissions of nitrous oxides
and sulfur dioxide, the principal pollutants that cause acid rain); see also Keith Harley, Symposium on Energy
Law: Article: Mercurucurialbut not Swift - U.S. EPA's Initiative to Regulate Coal Plant Mercury Emissions
Changes Course Again as it Enters a Third Decade, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 277, 287 (2011). Equipment
designed to remove particulate matter is also effective at removing mercury. Id. These systems typically work
by injecting activated carbon, a sorbent material into hot gases flowing from boilers. Id. Mercury adheres to
the sorbent material, which is subsequently removed by particulate matter collection systems. Id.

62. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2715-16 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
63. §7412(n)(1)(A).
64.Id.
65. Id.
66. Section 7412(n)(1) of the Clean Air Act also mandated two additional studies focused on mercury
emissions from power plants. The first was "a study of mercury emissions from [power plants], municipal
waste combustion units, and other sources, including area sources" ("Mercury Study"). § 7412(n)(1)(B). This
Mercury Study aimed to analyze mercury emissions by taking into account (1) the rate and mass of such
emissions, (2) the health and environmental effects of such emissions, (3) technologies available to control
such emissions, and (4) costs of such technologies. Id. The second study was conducted by the National
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences on "the threshold level of mercury exposure below which human

health effects are not expected to occur" ("NIEHS Study"). Id. § 7412(n)(1)(C).
67. §7412(n)(1)(A).
68. § 7412 (d)(1); see also Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (noting that EPA decided to regulate power
plant HAPS "on the same terms as ordinary major and area sources").
69. § 7412(d)(2); see also Harley, supra note 61, at 281 (describing the process for determining a
MACT for large commercial and industrial sources).
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A. Chevron Deference and the Clean Air Act
The Court reviewed the MATS under the two-pronged test established in
Chevron,7 0 in which the reviewing court will grant deference unless the expert
agency's interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute." 7 1 Michigan builds on previous applications of Chevron deference to the
EPA's statutory interpretations. 72 For example, in 2014, the Court in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. EPA found that EPA's interpretation of a "major emitting
facility" in the context of the Prevention of Significant Deterioration ("PSD")
and Title V programs was not permissible under Chevron step two. 73 Resolving
a challenge to EPA's "Tailoring Rule," 74 Justice Scalia found that the rule was
due no deference under Chevron because the EPA failed to give effect to
unambiguous intent of Congress and thereby "went well beyond the 'bounds of
its statutory authority"' in promulgating the Tailoring Rule. 75
B. Regulating Mercury in Power Plant Emissions
EPA asserted its statutory authority to regulate power plant mercury
emissions as "appropriate and necessary" under § 7412(n)(1)(A) without
considering costs to power plants. 76 Mercury is a naturally occurring element of
coal. 77 While combustion of coal is the largest source of atmospheric mercury,
this is not the only source. 7 8 Municipal and medical waste incinerators, gold
mining, and other industrial sectors also contribute to mercury emissions. 7 9
Once atmospheric mercury reaches lakes and rivers, aquatic microorganisms
convert it to methylmercury. 80 In turn, methylmercury tends to bioaccumulate in

70. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. The Chevron test affords discretion to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes if the agency's decision satisfies a two-step analysis. Under step one, the court asks
"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Then, in step two, the court
determines whether the choice represents a "reasonable interpretation." When Congress's intent "is clear, that
is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." Courts apply step two only if "Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue."

71. Id. at 844.
72. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712-14 (Thomas, J., concurring).

73. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2449 (2014).
74. Id. at 2437-38 (quoting § 7479(1)) (noting that under the Tailoring Rule, EPA proposed to adjust the
statutory thresholds for a "major emitting facility" of greenhouse gas to 100,000 tons per year to replace the
values in the statute that set the threshold of 100 tons per year for listed facilities and 250 tons per year for
other facilities and under the Tailoring Rule, facilities with the potential to emit at least 100,000 tons per year
of greenhouse gas would have been subject to PSD and Title V permitting for their construction and operation).

75. Id. at 2445 (quoting Arlington, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (emphasis
deleted)). Justice Scalia found it "hard to imagine a term less ambiguous" than the numbers given in this
section of the Clean Air Act. Id. Consequently EPA "went well beyond the 'bounds of its statutory authority'
in promulgating the Tailoring Rule.

76. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
77. Harley, supra note 61, at 278.
78. Cleaner
Power
Plants,
U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL
https://www.epa.gov/mats/cleaner-power-plants (last visited June 18, 2016).

PROTECTION

AGENCY,

79. Id.
80. How People Are Exposed to Mercury, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
http://www.epa.gov/mercury/how-people-are-exposed-mercury (last visited June 18, 2016).

AGENCY,
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'

the food chain and increase mercury levels in the flesh of top-level predatory fish
consumed by people.8
The Utility RTC found "a plausible link between anthropogenic releases of
mercury from industrial and combustion sources in the United States and
methylmercury in fish" and concluded that power plant emissions remained a
health risk to specific populations, particularly women of child-bearing age. 82 In
addition, the study concluded that such emissions were increasing from coalfired power plants. 83
C. A History ofMercury Regulationfor PowerPlants
EPA actions towards regulating power plant HAPs have spanned twenty
years and four presidential administrations. 84
Congress signed the
aforementioned 1990 Clean Air Act amendments into law during the George
H.W. Bush administration. 85 This created the framework for regulating all
major HAP sources. 86 The Clinton administration then oversaw the completion
of the Utility RTC along with development of MACTs for more than sixty
categories of industry other than power plants. 87
On December 14, 2004, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Bush
v. Gore signaled the end of President Clinton's EPA, the agency issued a
regulatory decision mandating that regulation of power plant HAPs was
"appropriate and necessary" upon the findings of the Utility RTC.88 This
finding placed power plants on the list of sources, preemptively requiring EPA to
establish emission standards for HAPs. 89
The Regulatory Finding stated EPA's reasons for concluding that regulating
power plants was both "appropriate" and "necessary." 9 0 EPA stated that
regulation was "appropriate" because power plants posed health and
environmental hazards, and controls were available to "effectively" reduce such
emissions. 9 1 Separately, EPA stated that regulation was "necessary" because
implementation of other provisions of the Clean Air Act would not "adequately

81. Id.
82. Utility RTC, supra note 26, at § 7-1, § 7.2.2.
83. Id.
84. Harley, supra note 61, at 277-78.
85. Harley, supra note 61, at 279.
86. Harley, supra note 61, at 280..
87. Harley, supra note 61, at 282.
88. Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandatefor Agencies to Consider Costs, 2015 CATO

SUP. CT. REv. 281, 281-82 (2014 -2015). The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore ended the possibility
of Gore's presidency, a presidency that would have likely resulted in a continuation of Clinton's environmental
policies and the development of MACTs for power plants. Id.

89. Id.; see also Regulatory Finding, supra note 26, at 79,826. NEED EXPLANATORY
PARENTHETICAL
90. Regulatory Finding, supra note 27, at 79,830.
91. Id.
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address" the public health and environmental hazards. 92 The Regulatory Finding
survived an initial judicial challenge in the D.C. Circuit. 93
1. New Jersey v. EPA
Under the George W. Bush administration, EPA changed course, issuing a
Delisting Decision stating that it was "neither appropriate nor necessary" to
regulate power plants under § 7412.94 In an attempt to circumnavigate the
Regulatory Finding, EPA proposed an alternative rule, the Clean Air Mercury
Rule ("CAMR"). 9 5
In New Jersey v. EPA, a group of states and environmental organizations
challenged CAMR and claimed that the Delisting Decision was inconsistent with
the plain language of § 7412.96 In defense of CAMR, the EPA explained that its
decision to delist power plants was justified in light of the "entirely different
structure and predicate" for listing power plants. 97 In addition, EPA claimed that
the December 2000 Regulatory Finding "did not meet the statutory criteria for
listing." 98 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with EPA, finding EPA's Delisting
Decision to be improper because it did not fully satisfying the statutory delisting
requirements. 99 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Delisting Decision
and CAMR and remanded to the EPA to develop performance standards for
power plants under § 7412.100
2. Development of the MATS
Following the election of President Barack Obama, EPA again turned its
attention to regulating power plant HAPs. With CAMR vacated, EPA issued a
Proposed Rule establishing emission standards for power plant HAPs on May 3,
2011.101 EPA stated that its decision to regulate power plants remained
92. Id.
93. Utility Air Regulatory Group. v. EPA, No. 01-1074 consolidated with 01-1078, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 18436, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2001) (dismissing the lawsuit because "judicial review of the listing of
a source category under section 7412(c) of the Act is not available until after emission standards are issued").
94. Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants From
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam

Generating Units From the Section 7412(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994, 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter
"Delisting Decision"].
95. Id.; Harley, supra note 61, at 284 (noting that the EPA proposed to removed power plants from the
list of source categories under § 7412(c) and to establish a replacement regulatory program under § 7411
featuring a voluntary cap-and-trade program for new and existing power plants).

96. 517 F.3d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
97. Id. at 580 (quoting Delisting Decision, supra note 94, at 16,001).
98. Id.
99. Id.at 581. EPA may delist source categories only if the agency determines that, for sources that emit
cancer-causing pollutants, "no source in the category . . . emits such hazardous air pollutants which may cause
a lifetime cancer risk greater than one in a million." § 7412(c)(B)(i)-(ii). EPA may delist sources emitting
pollutants that cause health effects other than cancer or adverse environmental effects only if "no source in the
category or subcategory concerned . . . exceed[s] a level which is adequate to protect public health with an
ample margin of safety." New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 577 (finding that EPA did not meet these requirements).

100. New Jersey, 517 F.3d at 583-84.
101. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-
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"appropriate and necessary," was "wholly consistent" with the 2000 Regulatory
Finding, and was supported by "additional technical analysis" conducted since
the threshold decision of December 2000.102 Accordingly, the Proposed Rule
included several important modifications of EPA's explanation of "appropriate
and necessary."1 03
First, EPA expanded the scope of its "appropriate" decision, stating that it
was appropriate to regulate power plants because of hazards to public health and
the environment "posed by HAP emissions from EGUs [electricity generating
units] alone or in conjunction with HAP emissions from other sources." 104 In
other words, EPA stated that its decision could be based on the "cumulative
impacts of HAP emissions from EGUs and other sources." 105 Second, EPA
clarified that its decision could be based on "any single HAP."1 0 6 Thus, the
hazard posed by mercury alone could justify the decision to regulate.1 07 Finally,
EPA said cost had no bearing on its decision to regulate.1 08 Similarly, EPA
offered two reasons to explain why it was "necessary," to regulate power plant
HAPs under § 7412.109 First, EPA said that it was necessary because it had
already found it appropriate to regulate, and second, the "hazards to public health
or the environment [would] not be adequately addressed by the imposition of the
requirements of the [Clean Air Act]."" 0
IV. INSTANT CASE

In a 5-4 opinion, the Supreme Court held that EPA unreasonably refused to
consider costs in its initial decision to regulate power plants."'I Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia found that EPA erred by ignoring costs at the initial
listing stage because such treatment of power plants failed to reflect the "unique"
process for regulating power plant HAPs that Congress intended. 112 The
majority decision invoked Chevron, but found that EPA's refusal to consider

Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units; Proposed

Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976, 24,986 (May 3, 2011) [hereinafter Proposed Rule].
102. White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1232; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,986.
103. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,976.
104. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,988 (emphasis added).
105. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,987.
106. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,988.
107. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,988.
108. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,988 ("We further interpret the term 'appropriate' to not allow
for the consideration of costs in assessing whether HAP emissions from EGUs pose a hazard to public health or
the environment.").
109. White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1233; see also Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,987.
110. Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,977, 24,991 (stating that "[i]f we determine that the imposition
of the requirements of the CAA will not address the identified hazards, EPA must find it necessary to regulate
EGUs under section [7412]") EPA took this one step further in stating that they may find it necessary to
regulate even if there is uncertainty. "In addition, we may determine it is necessary to regulate under section
[7412] even if we are uncertain whether the imposition of the requirements of the CAA will address the

identified hazards." (emphasis added)).
111. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015).
112. Id. at 2705, 2707.
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industry's costs of implementing the MATS was unreasonable under Chevron
step two.113

The majority opinion recognized that EPA's threshold decision to regulate
did not consider the costs of the MATS-mandated emission control equipment
for affected coal- and oil-fired plants.11 4 Costs came into play later -- and then
only indirectly -- when EPA calculated emission limits based on subcategories of
regulated power plants.11 5 The lack of upfront cost consideration, Justice Scalia
wrote, went "far beyond [the] bounds" of reasonable interpretation.116
Justice Kagan, authoring the four-Justice dissent, argued that the later stage
-- the lengthy process between the initial decision to regulate and the issuance of
emission standards -- included an "exhaustive consideration of costs."11 7 This,
in the dissent's opinion, was enough.11 8 Importantly, Justice Kagan stated that
she "agree[d] with the majority . .. that EPA's power plant regulation would be
unreasonable if '[t]he Agency gave cost no thought at all.' "119 Thus, the
dissent's principal disagreement with the majority is not whether, but when the
EPA must consider cost in this particular context.1 20 Finally, Justice Thomas's
concurrence underscored the majority's concern that EPA exceeded the
traditional limits of Chevron deference, but Justice Thomas took it one step
further. 12 1 He opined that EPA's interpretation in this instance "raises serious
questions about the constitutionality" of allowing broad deference to agency
interpretations of federal statutes. 12 2
A. Initial Challenge to the MATS: White Stallion v. EPA
State, industry, and labor petitioners challenged the MATS in the D.C.
Circuit in White Stallion v. EPA.1 23 In a 2-1 decision, the White Stallion court
denied the petitioners' arguments and upheld the MATS as a permissible
interpretation of the Clean Air Act. 124 In response to the petitioners' complaint
that EPA unreasonably failed to consider costs in its "appropriate and necessary"
determination, the court acknowledged that § 7412 "neither requires EPA to
consider costs nor prohibits EPA from doing so."' 2 5 Consequently, the court

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 2706-07.
Id. at 2706.
See id. at 2710-11.
Id. at 2707.

117. Id. at 2714, 2716 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("Cost is almost always a relevant -- and usually, a highly
important -- factor in regulation.").

118. Id. at 2716.
119. Id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (second alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Michigan,

135 S. Ct. at 2706 (majority opinion)).
120. See id. at 2718 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).

122. Id.
123. White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1229.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1237.
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pointed out that there are many sections of the Clean Air Act where Congress
explicitly intended EPA to consider costs, but § 7412 is not one of them. 12 6
With this, the majority found that EPA's interpretation was permissible in
the context of the 1990 amendments. 127 The court rejected the petitioner's
arguments against EPA's interpretation of "appropriate," finding that EPA did
not err in several key decisions. 128 The court also struck down several technical
challenges to EPA's calculation of the floor standards and emission reporting
requirements.1 29 In doing so, the White Stallion court noted that it should "show
particular deference 'where the agency's decision rests on an evaluation of
complex scientific data within the agency's technical expertise.' "130 The
dissenting judge disagreed and stated that "it is unreasonable for EPA to exclude
consideration of costs in determining whether it is 'appropriate' to impose
significant new regulations on electric utilities." 1 3 1
B. The Michigan Majority: Defining "Reasoned Decisionmaking"
In Michigan, the Supreme Court disagreed with the White Stallion majority
in deciding whether it was reasonable for EPA to ignore costs in the "appropriate
and necessary" determination. 132 Here, the critical analysis under Chevron step
two centered on "reasoned decisionmaking," in which an agency's rules must be
within its scope of authority and derived from a "logical and rational" decision
process.1 33 While Congress undoubtedly gave EPA the authority to regulate
HAP emissions from stationary sources in general, the Court questioned whether
EPA improperly left costs out of its threshold determination that regulating
power plants was "appropriate and necessary." 1 34
In oral argument, EPA conceded that it "could have interpreted this
provision to mean that cost is relevant to the decision."1 3 5 But instead, since the
statute does not expressly require an analysis of costs, EPA interpreted the term
"appropriate" as allowing EPA to decide whether to consider costs in its initial
decision to regulate, and EPA decided not to do so. 13 6 Further, EPA noted that

126. Id.
127. Id. at 1239.
128. Id. at 1244-45.

The EPA decisions approved in White Stallion included (1) considering

environmental harms along with health harms posed by HAP emissions, (2) finding that it could consider
cumulative, non-power plant HAP emissions, and (3) setting standards for all listed HAPs, "not for merely for
those HAPs it has expressly determined to cause health or environmental hazards." Id. at 1244 (citing Final

Rule, supra note 6, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9325-26).
129. Id. at 1248.
130. Id. at 1233 (quoting Troy Corp. v. Browner, 120 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
131. Id. at 1259 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
132. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
133. Id. at 2706 (quoting Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)).
134. See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012)).
135. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Tr. of Oral Arg. at 44, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)
(Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49)).
136. Id. (citing Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24988; Final Rule, supra note 6, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9327).
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the decision to regulate would be "appropriate" if any single HAP emitted by
utilities "posed a hazard to health or the environment." 1 37
The Michigan majority followed the precedent set in Utility Air Utility
Group v. EPAl 3 8 in holding that EPA unreasonably decided to forgo
consideration of power plants' compliance costs. 139 Indeed, instead of ignoring
costs, the majority found it reasonable -- and even compulsory in this case -- for
EPA to consider the costs in the front-end of the regulatory decision. 14 0
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that in general, agencies should see the
economic "reality that 'too much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem
may well mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with
other (perhaps more serious) problems.""41
1. Power Plants are "Different"
The majority opinion opens with a brief history of EPA regulations for
power plant HAPs, noting that the statutory procedures for making the threshold
decision to regulate power plants are a "stark contrast" to the procedures for all
other sources. 142 Congress established a bright-line test for determining whether
to regulate non-power-plant sources but wrote a separate provision for power
plants.1 43 Power plants, then, are "different[]."l 4 4
Once subject to regulation, EPA sets emission standards based on the levels
that have already been achieved by the best-performing twelve percent of
sources within each subcategory.1 4 5 Because the standards are based on
performance of plants succeeding in the market economy, cost considerations are
"built right into" the process of calculating the floor-standards. 146 Here, once
EPA listed power plants as a source under § 7412(c), the subsequent regulatory
process amounted to exactly the same process used for other HAP sources.1 4 7
But Congress developed a special provision for power plants, §
7412(n)(1)(A), to require studies of the health effects of mercury before
subjecting the already highly-regulated facilities to additional regulatory

137. Id. at 2708 (quoting Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 24,989).
138. Utility Air Regulatory Group, 134 S. Ct. at 2442 (noting that even under Chevron deference,
"agencies must operate within the bounds of reasonable interpretation").

139. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2707-08 (quoting Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 233 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 2707.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2705; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (2012) (noting that emission limits will be at least as

stringent as "the best performing 12 percent of the existing sources").

146. Id. at 2715 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 2716 (noting that EPA first determined the appropriate "subcategories" of power plants
and calculated "floor standards" for each subcategory, and that EPA next decided whether to apply more
stringent standards "beyond the standards"). In some circumstances, the EPA may impose more stringent
emission regulations, known as "beyond-the-floor" standards; the statute expressly requires the agency to

consider costs when imposing beyond-the-floor standards under §7412(d)(2). Id. (quoting § 7412(d)(2)).
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burdens. 148 In consideration of this provision, the Court observed that EPA's
regulatory actions ignored the special treatment that Congress intended and
amounted to treating power plants "on the same terms as ordinary major and area
sources."149 Accordingly, the majority noted that EPA's "preference for
symmetry cannot trump an asymmetrical statute." 15 0
2. No Reason to Ignore Costs
The majority took note of EPA's reasons for ignoring costs in its initial
decision to regulate, and, in turn, explained why each was improper. 15 1 First, the
Court reviewed EPA's position that costs were not compulsory in the
"appropriate" analysis because § 7412(n)(1)(A) of the Clean Air Act does not
mention cost while other sections do.1 52 The Court found this to be an
unreasonable inference on grounds that expressly requiring consideration of
costs for some industries does not make costs irrelevant to other industries. 153
Second, the Court distinguished EPA's reliance on Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, Inc. 154 The Court said that Whitman should not control
here because the "appropriate and necessary" clause of § 7412(n)(a)(A) does not
dictate particular factors and is "far more comprehensive" than the provisions
analyzed in Whitman. 155
Third, the Court faulted EPA's argument that it was acceptable to ignore
costs in its initial decision to regulate on the premise that the later stages of
establishing emission limitations included cost considerations. 156 Justice Scalia
likened this decision to a driver who "decide[s] whether it is 'appropriate' to buy
a Ferrari without thinking about cost, because he plans to think about cost later
when deciding whether to upgrade the sound system." 1 5 7

148. See id. at 2705 (majority opinion).
149. See id. (citing Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9330).

150. Id. at 2710 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep't of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 296 (2011)).
151. Id. at 2708-09.
152. Id. at 2709.
153. Id. Justice Scalia explained his reasoning by drawing a comparison to environmental effects. Id.
For example, "[o]ther parts of the Clean Air Act also expressly mention environmental effects, while §
7412(n)(1)(A) does not. Yet that did not stop EPA from deeming environmental effects relevant to the
appropriateness of regulating power plants." Id.

154. Id. (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)). In Whitman, the Court
held that the provision requiring EPA to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") at levels
"allowing an adequate margin of safety ... requisite to protect the public health" did not allow consideration of

cost. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465, 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)). There, the statute compelled
EPA to consider only public health protection with an adequate margin of safety. Id. at 495-96 (Breyer, J.,
concurring). Because the statute directed EPA to use particular factors in developing NAAQS, cost was
correctly precluded from this analysis. See id. at 496

155. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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3. The Regulatory Impact Analysis: Not Relevant to EPA's Decision
A central principal of administrative law is that "a court may uphold agency
action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action." 158
Here, EPA did not consider cost prior to publishing the Listing Decision. 159
Instead, EPA's Listing Decision noted that the agency would not consider costs
until the emission limits stage.1 60 With this, the majority held EPA to its
original basis: "cost is irrelevant to the decision to regulate."'61
An Executive Order requires agencies to assess the costs and benefits of
proposed rules that have an economic impact of at least $100 million. 162 MATS
fell under this requirement and EPA published their Regulatory Impact Analysis
("RIA") in December 2012.163 The RIA quantified direct benefits of mercury
reduction to mercury's effects on aquatic environments and human consumption
of fish. 164 Yet EPA's brief to the Supreme Court stated that the RIA did not
influence its threshold listing decision. 16 5
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia remarked that the annual costs of
$9.6 billion outweighed the direct benefits worth $4 to $6 million per year by a
factor of 1,600 to 2,400.166 The dissent cited RIA estimates of the anticipated
health benefits (between $37 and $90 billion) resulting from ancillary
benefits. 167 But ultimately, the Court found it unnecessary to decide which set
of benefits was the best valuation of the Final Rule since those cost projections
did not "form the basis for the appropriate and necessary finding."' 68
4. Majority Disposition: Remand Without Vacatur
Resting on this analysis, the Court remanded the MATS to the D.C. Circuit
without vacating the standards. 169 Courts have used remand without vacatur in
cases where agency action has repairable flaws or when the consequences of
vacating the action would be disruptive.1 70 In the D.C. Circuit, treatment of a
case under such disposition is typically based on factors from Allied-Signal v.
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in which a regulation under

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 2710 (emphasis added) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).
Id.
See id. at 2710-11.
Id. at 2710.
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738, 51,741 (Oct. 4, 1993).
See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2705 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
RIA, supra note 31, at 4-1 - 4-3..
Brief for the Federal Respondents, supra note 30, at 53, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015)

(Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49) ("EPA concedes that the regulatory impact analysis 'played no role' in its
appropriate-and-necessary finding.")

166. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
167. Id. at 2721 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the RIA estimated that the implementation costs
would likely increase ratepayers' electricity costs by about three percent).

168. Id. at 2711 (majority opinion) (quoting Final Rule, supra note 6, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9323).
169. Id. at 2712.
170. Stephanie J. Tatham, The Unusual Remedy of Remand Without Vacatur, ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES,l
(January
3,
2014),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Remand%20Without%20Vacatur%/20Final%20Report.pdf
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judicial review remains in effect when the consequences of invalidating a
regulation are "disruptive."'71
C. The Dissent: ConsideringCosts Down the Road is Enough

Justice Kagan opined that EPA's decision to regulate was reasonable "[a]t
the outset"1 72 because later actions included costs "again and again."' 73 In
addition, the dissent postulated that it would not have been possible for EPA to
estimate costs in its initial decision with any accuracy because the steps that
facilities would be required to take to comply with an undetermined standard
were unknown at that point.1 74
After endorsing EPA's decision to exclude costs from its threshold listing
decision, Justice Kagan found it "inequitable" to apply a regulatory regime to
every industry except for power plants, especially since such plants are "a
significant part of the air toxics problem."' 75 Further, she pronounced that after
the Utility RTC found that the acid rain provisions had failed to provide the
collateral effects that Congress hoped for, the reasons for regulating power plants
differently "went up in smoke."1 7 6 Justice Kagan advocated for a holistic view
of the "entire regulatory process," rather than looking only at the first step
through "blinders." 1 77 This, she said, was the correct way to interpret whether
regulation was "appropriate." 78 Thus, the dissent approved of EPA's
"appropriate and necessary" finding -- even though it did not consider costs --

because "EPA knew when it made [the] finding that it would consider costs at
every subsequent stage."' 79
To support her conclusion, Justice Kagan highlighted components of EPA's
development process that show cost considerations, including the categorization
and sub-categorization of power plants, the reporting requirements, and the
RIA. 8 0 For example, when EPA made its initial decision to regulate power
plants, EPA intended to divide facilities to be regulated into two categories: coalfired and oil-fired. 18 1 Later when developing floor-standards, EPA subdivided
the categories into five subcategories intended to "affect the ease of attaining a
given emissions level." 1 8 2 The additional categories accommodated costs and
171. Allied-Signal v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 988 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also
infra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.

172. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2724 (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("[C]alculating costs before starting to write a regulation would
put the cart before the horse.").

175. Id. at 2723 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9322 (quoting 136 Cong.
Rec. 3602 (1990) (statement of Sen. Durenberger))).

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
2000).
182.

Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2718 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2721 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 2718-22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2719 (Kagan, J., dissenting); citing Regulatory Finding, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,830 (Dec. 20,
Id. at 2720 (Kagan, J., dissenting); citing Proposed Rule, supra note 101, at 25,036-37 (defining the
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generated floor-standards with cost consideration "baked right in."1 83 By
definition, floor standards incorporate costs because they use real-world data for
the best-performing twelve percent of existing sources which "have had to
consider costs in choosing their own emissions levels" while operating
successfully.1 84 Finally, EPA included additional caveats that made it easier for
plants to comply1 85 and report 86 to the regulatory agency.
D. The Concurrence: Outside the Lanes of Chevron Deference

As previously stated, the Court reviewed EPA's decision under the standard
established in Chevron. 187 The majority found that EPA's decision to consider
two factors (health and environmental effects and availability of controls) while
leaving out the third factor (cost of controls) did not merit Chevron deference. 188
On the other hand, the dissent interpreted Chevron as a mandate to review EPA's
actions with "caution and care," stepping in only if the result becomes
"something Congress would never have allowed." 1 89
This division compelled Justice Thomas to write separately in support of
the majority, concluding that "EPA's interpretation deserves no deference." 1 9 0
The concurrence further questioned the broad practice of deferring to an
agency's interpretation of ambiguous federal statutes, finding that it raises
"serious separation-of-powers questions."'91 The concurrence went on to argue
that when Chevron deference prevents judges from ruling based on "what they
believe is 'the best reading of an ambiguous statute,"' 1 92 it is in tension with
categories based on the fuels burned: high-rank coal, low-rank virgin coal, low-rank virgin coal, and liquid oil,
and solid oil, and separately categorizing gasification combined cycle (IGCC) facilities).

183. Id. at 2719 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 2715 (Kagan, J., dissenting); but see id. at 2710-11 (majority opinion). The majority criticized
this argument because it ignores the fact that many power plants are regulated by other state and federal
requirements that require high-performing emissions equipment, invalidating the premise that top-performing
plants were not constrained by costs. Also, the majority pointed out that EPA itself said costs did not play a
role in the categorization process. While EPA listed many other factors included in the categorization process
(size of facility, fuel type, plant type, and geographic conditions), costs were not among them.
185. Id. at 2720 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9401) (establishing a separate
subcategory for power plants in Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands because these locations
have "minimal control over the quality of available fuel"); id. at 2719, n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Regulatory Finding, supra note 2_at 79,831) (choosing not to regulate natural gas plants because these plants
emit only negligible amounts of HAPs); id. at 2725 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Final Rule, supra note 6, at
9331) (choosing not to adopt "beyond-the-floor standards" for all but one of the subcategories because
standards lower than the twelve percent floor would "not be 'reasonable after considering costs').
186. Id. at 2020-21 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the Final Rule allowed power plants to choose
from two reporting methods: either "input-based" ("emissions per unit of energy used") or "output-based"
("emissions per unit of useful energy produced"), and allowed facilities to average the emissions for multiple
units located on the same site-so that individual units would not have to meet standards as long as the site
average met them).

187. Id. at 2606-07 (majority opinion) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
188. Id. at 2708 ("Chevron ... does not license interpretive gerrymanders under which an agency keeps
parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.").

189. Id. at 2718 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 2712 (Thomas, J., concurring).
191. Id.
192. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
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Article III's Vesting Clause. 193 When this occurs, Justice Thomas sees EPA's
efforts to regulate power plants as an attempt to pursue its own policy goals
instead of simply making judgments that are needed to implement Congressional
policies.1 94
V. ANALYSIS
The outcome of Michigan demonstrates the problem created when a court
remands regulations without vacatur, a mandate for the regulated community to
comply with requirements that may or may not be upheld. The Michigan
majority found it impermissible for EPA to regulate power plant HAPs without
first considering costs, yet the court left the regulation in force under remand. 19 5
The MATS had required power plants to collectively spend close to an estimated
$9.6 billion dollars before challenges to the regulation reached the Supreme
Court. 196 But the Michigan remand did nothing to ebb additional spending.
Consequently, the Court's disposition of MATS -- remand without vacatur -exposes a noteworthy gap in the judicial system's handling of regulations under
such disposition. Because the regulated community may not be able to recover
the costs of complying with environmental regulations later found to be illegal,
remand without vacatur penalizes utilities. 197
Traditionally, courts analyze regulations on remand without vacatur using
the two-step test established in Allied-Signal, which determines the fate of such
regulations based on: (1) "the seriousness of the order's deficiency" and (2) "the
disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed."' 9 8
During the period following a remand without vacatur, there is uncertainty about
both the retrospective and prospective enforcement of a regulation.1 9 9 Whether
or not the court will allow agencies to enforce a regulation during the period
after remand without vacatur rests on the outcome of the Allied-Signal test.20 0
Once a court has remanded a regulation, it has already recognized a serious
deficiency, and so the most important work comes in the second step of AlliedSignal.20 1 At this step, courts have considered, for example, the effect of vacatur

545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005)).
193. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
194. See id. at 2713 (Thomas, J., concurring).

195. See id. at 2712 (majority opinion).
196. See, e.g., Wehland, supra note 11 (noting that most facilities, with the exception of the
approximately 160 units that have an extended compliance date of April 15, 2016, have already come into

compliance with MATS).
197. Jonas J. Monast and Sarah K. Adair, Article: A Triple Bottom Line for Electric Utility Regulation:
Aligning State-Level Energy, Environmental, and Consumer Protection Goals, 38 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3

(2013).
198. Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 150-51 (quoting International Union, UMV v. FMSHA, 920 F.2d 960,
967 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
199. Kristina Daugirdas, Note: Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial Remedy for

Defective Agency Rulemakings, 80 N.Y.U. L REV. 278, 303 (2005).
200. Id. at 281.
201. Id. at 294.

2017]

THE EPA ON THIN AIR

533

on the affected agency's ability to retain feeS 202 or whether vacatur would
"defeat the enhanced protection of the environmental values covered by the EPA
rule at issue." 203 Courts have also upheld regulations under remand without
vacatur to protect the reliance interests of the regulated community when the
mandated actions were already implemented. 2 04 However, few applications of
Allied-Signal have considered the interim costs of the regulation during judicial
review. 2 05
Even though courts have generally not considered the regulated
community's compliance costs, such costs should be incorporated into the
Allied-Signal analysis going forward for two reasons. First, because, as the
Michigan decision indicates, traditional deference to agency rulemaking under
Chevron is under attack and reviewing courts may increasingly call for remand
without vacatur. 20 6 Second, EPA has a record for changing course in accordance
with the political climate, 207 and it is reasonable to believe that this trend will
continue. And so it is all the more important for courts to use Allied-Signal in a
consistent manner to reduce the uncertainty for the regulated community that
follows remand without vacatur. When the factors indicate significant costs to
industry, courts should allow relief in the form of extended compliance deadlines
for affected facilities that are unable to comply with uncertain regulatory
directives. The current stay of the Clean Power Plan, which was poised to
require significant investments by the regulated community, 208 is an
unmistakable signal that the Supreme Court recognizes this uncertainty and will
take decisive action to prevent it.209

202. E.g., id. at 151 (noting that vacatur would require the NRC to refund collected fees.).

203. Homer City, 696 F.3d at 37-38 (quoting North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
2008)).
204. E.g., Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative of Florida v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(declining to vacate a USDA payment in kind program for sugar crops because the effected crops had already
been plowed under, the "egg [had] been scrambled," and "there [was] no apparent way to restore the status quo
ante"); contra Humane Society of the United States v. Jewell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 69, 137 (D.D.C. 2014) (vacating a
rule governing federal management of gray wolves because the disruption of the "regulatory regime" does not
outweigh substantive errors in the rule).
205. A rare example in which the court considered the implications of vacatur to an individual regulated

facility can be found in Sierra Club v. United States, 841 F. Supp. 2d 349, 363 (D.D.C. 2012) (declining to
vacate previous EIS approvals because doing so would cause parties not subject to the lawsuit to "serious
financial loss").
206. Prestes, supra note 17, at 109.
207. See supra text accompanying note 94.
208. Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Carbon Pollution Guidelines for Existing Power
Plants and Emission Standardsfor Modified and Reconstructed Power Plants, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, EPA Report

no.

EPA-452/R-14-002

(June

http://www3.epa.gov/ttnecasl/regdata/RIAs/11ldproposalRlAfinalO602.pdf
compliance in 2020 will range from $7.3 to $8.8 billion dollars).

(projecting

209. West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 981 (Feb. 9, 2016).
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A. Chevron Deference Does Not Allow the EPA to Ignore Costs
The Supreme Court's flexibility under Chevron appears to be on the decline
or at least under attack, and the Michigan decision continues this trend. 2 10
Recent cases show that the Court is moving towards more rigorous standards
than those used in the past in order to comply with Chevron step two. 211 To be
clear, this Note does not suppose that Chevron is going away. Instead, this Note
proposes that the Court's decision in Michigan shows that Chevron step two is
becoming more difficult to satisfy. 2 12
The Michigan majority clarified that, although EPA is not necessarily
required to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis, the decision to refute any
consideration of costs was unreasonable under Chevron step two. 2 13 Although it
is not so plainly stated, the reasoning may be summarized as this: EPA must
consider costs under a statutory directive to regulate "if appropriate" unless costs
are otherwise precluded. 2 14 This directive sets Chevron "on its head," as it looks
at whether Congress has clearly spoken on cost rather than deferring to EPA's
discretion when Congress has not spoken clearly. 2 15
1. Costs of the MATS to the Regulated Community
The Michigan majority embraced the presumption that reasoned
decisionmaking should include consideration of costs. An Executive Order
issued by President Barack Obama requires agencies to analyze the benefits and
costs of a proposed "significant regulatory action." 2 16 EPA fulfilled this
requirement for the MATS with a Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA). The RIA
estimated compliance costs for affected power plants alongside projected health
benefits. 2 17 More than ninety percent of the health benefits were derived from
reductions of particulate emissions, which are ancillary benefits. 2 18 The balance
came from quantifiable estimates of developmental neurological effects from
210. Wehland, supra note 11.

211. See Jody Freeman, Symposium: Why I Worry about UARG, 39 HARV. ENv. L. REV. 9, 16 (2015).
An important development in UARG was its resurrection of the so-called "major questions" cannon derived
from FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. that required a direct and clear statement that Congress has
delegated authority to an agency rule of major social and economic importance. Brown & Williamson, 529
U.S. 120, 160 (2000). Meanwhile, Michigan sets forth a rigorous requirement for "reasoned decisionmaking"

in expansive regulatory decisions. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (quoting
Allentown,Serv., v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998)).
Although the logic of "major questions" is
fundamentally different than "reasoned decisionmaking," the two combined have the potential to stop the
rulemaking momentum of President Obama's EPA.

212. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
213. See id. at 2711.
214. See Grossman, supra note 88 (opining that "Michigan establishes as a baseline principle of
administrative law that agencies must give some consideration to costs when regulating under statutes that do
not preclude them from doing so").

215. Cf Christine Kexel Chabot, Article: Selling Chevron, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 481, 497 (2015).
216. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (defining a "significant regulatory
action" is one that has an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or ore or raises a novel legal or policy
issue); see also Caroline Cecot and W. Kip Viscusi, Article: Judicial Review of Agency Benefit-Cost Analysis,

22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 575, 575 (2015).
217. RIA, supra note 31, at 1-12 to 1-13.
218. RIA, supra note 31, atES-18.
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consumption of fish with accumulated methyl mercury. 2 19 It is striking that such
a small portion of the quantifiable benefits (mercury and other HAP emission
reductions) actually rested on the statutory directive. For now, the Court has not
forbidden EPA from using ancillary benefits in its cost analysis, but it may do so
in future cases. 220
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration ("EIA"), 22 1
64.4% of coal-fired power plants were already equipped with the technology
needed to comply with the MATS before EPA promulgated the Final Rule. 22 2
The remaining power plants were required to upgrade their facilities with
emissions control equipment, change fuel, or shut down. 2 23 In response, power
plants in at least thirty-seven states have made plans to close or convert to
another fuel type in response to the MATS and other EPA regulations. 224 It is
worth mentioning that plant operators, for the most part, did not make such
decisions based on the MATS alone. 22 5 Such decisions were made based upon
multiple regulatory directives from EPA, such as regional haze and cross state
pollution rules coupled with the current depressed natural gas prices. 22 6
It is difficult, then, to calculate a cumulative nationwide cost of MATS to
oil- and coal-fired power plants that have upgraded their emission control
systems. Overall, the cost of retrofitting each plant to comply with MATS will
depend on its existing equipment, type of fuel, and operation frequency. 227 To
add complication, power plants in states with regulated utility rates must show
that capital expenditures for retrofits meet certain criteria. 228 Then, utility
regulators must decide whether a facility may pass the cost of installing and
operating pollution control equipment on to their customers in the form of
increased rates. 229 For example, the Mississippi Public Service Commission
allows inclusion of operating expenses in ratemaking if they are "necessary,

219. RIA, supra note 31, at ES-6.
220. See The Supreme Court 2014 Term: Leading Case: FederalStatutes and Regulations: Clean Air

Act-Cost-Benefit Analysis-Michigan v. EPA, 129 HARV.L.REV. 311, 320 (2015).
221. About EIA, https://www.eia.gov/about/ (last visited January 31, 2016).
The U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) is an independent and impartial energy information organization funded by
Congress.
222. Michael Leff, Coal-FiredPower Plant Operators Consider Emissions Compliance Strategies U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., March 28, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1 5611.

223. Id.
224. Coal Unit Retirements, AM. COAL. FOR CLEAN COAL ELECTRICITY, Dec. 2015,
http://www.americaspower.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Coal-Unit-Retirements.pdf
(last visited January

31, 2016).
225. Neil Copel and Debashis Bose, Impact of Coal Plant Retirements on the Capacity and Energy
Market in PJM, http://bv.com/docs/reports-studies/impact-of-coal-plant-requirements-on-the-capacity-energy-

market-in-pjm.pdf (last visited January 31, 2016).
226. Id.
227. Michael Leff, Coal-FiredPower Plant Operators Consider Emissions Compliance Strategies, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., March 28, 2014, http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1 5611.
228. Monast & Adair, supra note 195. Utility rates in most states are approved by state public utility
commissions or public service commissions through a ratemaking approval process. Approval of consumer
rates in regulated states is typically a state process that considers reliability and affordability.
229. Id.
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prudent and reasonable expenses incurred or to be incurred in the rendition of the
utility's service." 2 30
Utility companies are obligated to deliver electricity in a "cost-effective
manner" 2 3 1 and must plan for capital expenditures ten to twenty years in
advance. 2 32 Thus, uncertain environmental regulations are disruptive and
require utility managers to compare the risks of investing in emissions
equipment in anticipation of regulatory deadlines with waiting until there is
regulatory certainty before acting. 2 33 If anticipated regulations do not come to
fruition -- or worse, if uncertainty continues -- utilities may be put in the position

of being unable to account for capital investment in states that do not allow rate
adjustments for prospective regulations. 234 For example, the Kentucky Public
Service Commission did not allow a utility company to increase rates to cover
investments in renewable energy because regulations requiring such investments
were not yet "known and measurable." 23 5

With the initial deadlines of April 15, 2015, and April 15, 2016, (for
facilities granted one-year extensions), 23 6 many plants required to install new
equipment had already done so prior to the Michigan decision. However some
plants have yet to install retrofits and struggle with ongoing uncertainty of the
MATS after Michigan. For example, a utility group in Indiana has not yet
installed scrubbers on their coal-fired plants at an estimated cost of $70 to $90
million. 23 7 The Indiana Regulatory Commission approved installation of the
scrubbers, but environmental groups challenged the decision, as they would
rather see the money spent to replace coal plants with natural gas-powered plants
instead of to retrofit coal plants. 23 8 As a second example in regard to direct
consumer costs, a utility authority that serves Montana and South Dakota
reported that its rates will increase an average of twenty percent after spending
$384 million to install controls needed to comply with MATS and regional haze
rules. 239 There are also supply-chain effects; for instance, MATS has spurred
litigation over a long-term coal supply contract for a Pennsylvania power
2 40
plant.
230. CODE MISS. R. 39-1-1:21.
231. Monast & Adair, supra note 195, at 5 (emphasis in original).
232. Interview with Chuck D. Barlow, Vice-President, Environmental Strategy & Policy, Entergy
Services Inc., Jackson, Miss. (Jan. 15, 2016).
233. Monast & Adair, supra note 197, at 35.

234. Id. at 43.
235. Id. (quoting Application of Ky. Power Co., No. 2009-00545, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
June 28, 2010), athttp://psc.ky.gov/ordervault/orders_2010/200900545 06282010.pdf (order denying request
for wind contract)).
236. Final Rule, supra note 6, at 9407 (noting that permitting authorities have the authority to grant
extensions of up to one year on a case-by-case basis when plants need additional time to install controls).
237. Darren Sweeney, Indiana Appeals CourtRemands IURC Approval of Vectren Plant Upgrades, SNL
FINANCIAL, Oct. 30, 2015, https://www.snl.com/interactiveX/article.aspx?ID=34352010&KPLT=2.

238. Id.
239. Lauren Bellero, Montana-Dakota Utilities Seeks Rate Hikes to
Transmission,
SNL
FINANCIAL,
July
https://www.snl.com/interactiveX/article.aspx?ID=33187035&KPLT=2.

Cover Plant Upgrades,
8,
2015,

240. Michael Niven, Alliance, FirstEnergy Square Off Over Coal Contract Breach Blamed on EPA
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EPA's cost estimate of $9.6 billion was calculated using the agency's
Integrated Planning Model ("IPM"), which is a tool that EPA uses to estimate
the cost of air pollution control policies for mercury, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur
oxides. 24 1 The IPM uses a number of assumptions related to the performance
efficiency of pollution control equipment, future fuel prices, and growth in
electricity demand. 242 Thus, there is inherent, unquantifiable error in the cost
predictions. Even so, the validity of EPA's cost predictions was not at issue in
Michigan. Instead, it was the lack of utilizing cost predictions that lead to the
majority's remand.
Since Michigan, EPA has not calculated the actual expenses incurred by
industry to comply with the MATS. However, in its post-Michigan defense of
the rule, EPA has released several cost metrics that estimate annual capital
expenditures at 2.7% to 5 .7% of total annual power sector capital expenditures
and annual compliance costs at 2.7% to 3.5% of annual electricity sales. 243
2. The Timing of EPA's Cost Consideration
Past decisions show that EPA may consider costs in the face of statutory
silence. 24 4 Michigan follows this precedent and adds the additional element of
timing. From the viewpoint of a regulated entity, EPA was inconsistent in its
consideration of the costs of MATS. On one hand, the Final Rule stated that
"EPA does not believe that it is appropriate to consider costs when determining
whether to regulate EGUs under [Clean Air Act] section [7412]."245 But in the
Michigan oral argument, EPA conceded that it "could have" used costs to
support the rule. 246 Notwithstanding this, the dissent praised EPA for its implicit
"exhaustive consideration of costs" throughout the development of MATS 24 7
and noted that compliance costs were less than the ancillary benefits. 24 8
The majority, however, disagreed and insisted that the agency should not be
permitted to change position on its consideration of costs. 249 Relying on the

Rules,
SNL
FINANCIAL,
March
https: //www.snl.com/interactiveX/article.aspx?ID=3 1506250&KPLT=2.

3,

2015,

241. RIA, supra note 31, at 3-1, 1-13.
242. RIA, supra note 31, at 3-31.
243. U.S. EPA, Fact Sheet: Consideration of Cost in the Appropriate and Necessary Findingfor the
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards for Power Plants, http://www3.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/20151120fs.pdf (last

visited Jan. 31, 2016).
244. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.3d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir 1987) (en banc)
(holding that under § 7412 "EPA is allowed to consider cost unless the statute expresses a clear congressional
intent to preclude consideration of costs"); EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. at 1607 n.21
(allowing EPA to consider costs because the statutory provision under review was silent on the issue of
whether costs should be considered); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 222 (2009) (endorsing
EPA's position to consider costs because the statute did not designate any factors to be considered).

245. Final Rule, supra note 6, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9323-24.
246. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2706 (2015) (citing Tr. of Oral Arg. at 44, Michigan v. EPA,
135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49)) ("I don't think the statutory text unambiguously forbids
[EPA] from considering costs.").

247. Id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 2722 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 2710 (majority opinion).
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"foundational principle of administrative law that a court may uphold agency
action only on the grounds that the agency invoked when it took the action,"
Justice Scalia deemed that EPA's reasoning for the threshold decision was
flawed. 2 50 With this, the majority found that EPA erred in its refusal to consider
costs in the threshold decision to regulate mercury and other power plant HAPs
and remanded the MATS without vacating it.251
B. Allied-SignalAhead
Allied-Signal is the most frequently cited case guiding treatment of rules
under remand without vacatur in the D.C. Circuit. 2 52 But under Allied-Signal,
the court rarely considers how much regulations under this treatment may cost
those with the most at stake: the regulated community. What is more, when a
court remands without vacating, it often provides little guidance to the lower
court on whether the remand should govern retrospectively and how the court
and regulating agency should proceed while correcting the flaws that led to
remand in the first place. 253 Such decisions are typically left to the lower
court. 2 54

Remand without vacatur is a controversial treatment, but courts have often
used it to give agencies a second chance to explain their rationale for a
regulatory decision. 2 55 Some judges have questioned whether remand without
vacatur is legal under the Administrative Procedure Act. 2 56 Even so, courts
today continue to remand administrative regulations without vacating. 2 57
The Allied-Signal case originated from a requirement that recipients of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ("NRC's") services pay an equally

250. Id. (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).
251. Id. at 2712.
252. Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d 146; see also, Tatham, supra note 170, at 12.
253. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 579 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that remand without vacatur "often
seems to occur without analysis and, perhaps, inadvertently").

254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Checkosky v. SEC (In re Checkosky), 23 F.3d 452, 462 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Silberman, J.,
separate opinion) (allowing the SEC to explain the reason for its ruling on "improper professional conduct" on
remand); see also Tatham, supra note 170, at 8 (noting that "the D.C. Circuit and other appellate courts have
continued to use the remedy . .. despite concerns noted by some of the D.C. Circuit judges").

256. E.g., Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(opining that the Administrative Procedure Act requires the court to "hold unlawful and set aside" an arbitrary
and capricious agency action (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A))). It is beyond the scope of this Note to fully
evaluate whether remand without vacator is legal under the Administrative Procedure Act, but additional
discussion of this topic is available in Daniel B. Rodriguez, Symposium: We've Only Just Begun: The Impact of
Remand Orders From Higher to Lower Courts on American Jurisprudence: Of Gift Horses and Great
Expectations:Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599 (2004).

257. E.g., NRDC v. United States EPA, 804 F.3d 149, 176 (2d Cir. 2015) (remanding without vacating a
vessel general permit because its standards and monitoring requirements were not sufficient to maintain water
quality standards in the Great Lakes and leaving the permit in effect during the remand period); Pollinator

Stewardship Council v. United States EPA, No. 13-72346, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19945, at *33 (9th Cir. Nov.
12, 2015) (deciding to vacate EPA's registration of a pesticide under an Allied-Signal analysis because the
pesticide could harm bee populations and the regulation was not protective enough); see also Daniel H.
Conrad, Article: Filling the Gap: The Retroactive Effect of Vacating Agency Regulations, 29 PACE ENVTL. L.

REV. 1, 23 (2011).
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apportioned amount for such services. 2 58 The petitioner in Allied-Signal was a
uranium hexafluoride converter that questioned the NRC's refusal to grant a fee
exemption for their particular industry. 259 The court acknowledged that due to
deficiencies in NRC's reasoning, the agency's action did not constitute
"reasoned decision-making." 2 60 However, the court did not vacate the rule
because the consequences of vacating would be "disruptive" to the NRC,
requiring it to refund fees to the entities it regulated. 26 1 In other words, costs to
the regulator -- not to the regulated industry -- were the key to the court's
reasoning in Allied-Signal.2 62
Though it did not rely directly on Allied-Signal, the D.C. Circuit's treatment
of the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 263 in North Carolinav. EPA is another
recent application of remand without vacatur. There, the D.C. Circuit initially
vacated CAIR upon finding "more than several fatal flaws in the rule." 2 64
However, the court reconsidered and remanded the rule to EPA without vacating
after EPA convinced the court that vacating the rule would compromise health
benefits already achieved by the rule and disrupt energy markets. 2 65
In Michigan, the remand of MATS after the compliance deadline has
caused uncertainty for the power plants that have been unable to finalize or
implement their plans for compliance. EPA extended the original April 15,
2015, compliance deadline by one year for many facilities 266 but for some, this
is not enough time. For instance, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) recommended that EPA allow five additional coal-fired power plants
extra time to comply with the MATS in order to maintain electricity reliability
and avoid shut-down. 267
The disposition of the MATS after the Michigan decision has been
especially difficult for small plants such as the Nucla Station, a small coal-fired
unit located in Nucla, Colorado, and owned by Tri-State Generation and
Transmission Association, Inc. (Tri-State). Tri-State asked the D.C. Circuit for
relief from the MATS-mandated requirements at Nucla Station. 268 The unit
already meets mercury limits and lacks compliance only for acid gas. 269 TnState petitioned the D.C. Circuit to vacate the MATS after the majority in
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d at 151.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id.
North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008). CAIR was developed to reduce the

impact of upwind states contributing to non-attainment of air quality standards for particulate matter and ozone
in downwind states using a regional cap-and-trade approach.

264. Id. at 901.
265. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
266. E.g., Wehland, supra note 11.
267. Marcy Crane, FERC Recommends Three More Utilities be Given '5th Year' Extensions of MATS
Compliance
Deadline,
SNL
FINANCIAL,
Dec.
3,
2015,
https://www.snl.com/interactivex/article.aspx?id=34725625&KPLT=6.
268. Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n Inc.'s Mot. to Govern Proceedings on Remand from

the U.S. Supreme Court 6, Sept. 24, 2015.
269. Id.
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Michigan found that the "sole legal basis for the rule was unlawful." 2 70 In the
alternative, Tri-State requested that the court suspend compliance deadlines for
the Nucla Station while the MATS is under review, asserting that "industry
should not have to build expensive new [equipment] until the standard is finally
determined." 27 1 Since Nucla Station managers had not yet determined how to
comply, Tri-State called it "manifestly unfair" to require the facility to make a
decision about new equipment or shut down before EPA has responded to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Michigan.272
On the other hand, some facilities that already meet the MATS oppose a
stay for Nucla Station 273 and now back EPA in its defense of the MATS to
protect the investments that they have already made. 27 4
Consequently,
commenters have referred to the Nucla Station as the "Trojan Horse," claiming
that it will open the door to stays for many other plants. 27 5 This shift comes
after facilities wanting to protect their reliance investments now believe that
vacating after so many have already invested in retrofits would be detrimental to
plants that have already complied. 2 76
1. The Allied-Signal Test Should Consider Industry's Costs
Nucla Station's situation exemplifies the need for courts to consider all
angles of a regulation on remand, including costs to the regulated community.
The timing of the Supreme Court decision in Michigan in concert with the
MATS deadlines leaves power plants with two choices: (1) purchase and install
equipment to comply with a rule that may be invalidated or (2) risk future noncompliance or a mandate to shut down. But under Allied-Signal the negative
consequences of such choices have rarely been considered.
Instead, courts applying Allied-Signal analysis to environmental regulations
typically place emphasis on disrupting the "enhanced protection" of
environmental regulations with little thought to the costs of such protection. 277
What is more, remand without vacatur favors agencies because it often allows

270. Id. at 1.
271. Id. at 12 (quoting Portland Cement Association v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
272. Id. at 12. As of the publication date of this Note, the D.C. Circuit has declined to stay the regulation
in response to Tri-State's petition.
273. Stuart Parker, EPA Outlines Planfor Utility MACT Remand In Opposition to Stay Request, INSIDE

EPA, August 10, 2015, at 1.
274. Annalee Grant, Utilities Urge Court to Ignore 'Idiosyncratic'Effortsto CreateMATS Turmoil, SNL
FINANCIAL, November 12, 2015, https://www.snl.com/interactiveX/article.aspx?ID=34482448&KPLT=2.

275. Id.
276. See Monast & Adair, supra note 197, at 7 (noting that many state public service commissions
review utility investment decisions under two standards: (1) a "prudent" investment standard and (2) a "used
and useful" test to ensure that a utility charges ratepayers only for necessary investments that directly benefit
rate payers, thus utilities that have invested in emissions control equipment that is no longer mandated by law
may not be able to recoup their costs).
277. See, e.g., North Carolina, 550 F.3d at 1178; but see California Communities Against Toxics v.

United States EPA, 688 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that rulemaking activities under the Clean Air
Act that allowed construction of a new power plant should be upheld because the only errors in the process ere
due to procedural errors and not substantive errors).
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them another chance to explain their reasons for a rule. 27 8 Thus, agencies get
another "bite at the apple" while industries are stuck with a possibly illegal
rule. 279 And unless the reviewing court says otherwise, the rule remains in
effect. 2 80 Lack of cost consideration can have serious practical implications for
industries and their customers. Thus, a shift in the courts' standard practice is
needed. Remanding courts should consider the effect of a remand without
vacatur on the regulated community and issue clear instructions to the lower
court regarding the treatment of affected facilities in the interim.
The Michigan case provides a fitting example of why relief for the
regulated community is necessary and will benefit both the regulator and the
regulated. Here, the majority and dissent noted that EPA must consider costs;
the opinions simply disagreed on the timing. 28 1 Given this disagreement, costs
to regulated power plants should be a factor included in the D.C. Circuit's
review of the MATS. Opinions may differ on how to assess the "disruptive
consequences" 2 82 of the remanded rule. But at minimum, the court should
consider the plants' ability to incorporate the costs of mercury-reducing
equipment in their ratemaking, particularly since EPA has committed to review
such costs in the court proceedings after Michigan.283
2. Courts Should Extend Compliance Deadlines for Affected Industries
This Note concludes that the court must balance the costs to the regulated
community and the expected health and environmental benefits in its treatment
of regulations under a remand without vacatur. The important questions, then,
are how should these factors be weighed and when should these factors affect
implementation of a rule while under judicial review. If costs are not significant
and the health and environmental benefits are substantial, regulatory deadlines
should remain in place. After all, granting extended deadlines merely because a
state or industry challenges a regulation is an unreasonable result, one that is
detrimental to environmental protection. But in the opposite situation, when the
costs significantly outweigh the benefits and there are significant, substantive
challenges to a regulation, the court should allow relief to the regulated
community earlier in the judicial review process.
The Court in West Virginia v. EPA found this burden was great enough to
warrant a complete stay at the onset of judicial review for the Clean Power
Plan. 28 4 In contrast, the Michigan court did not allow an emergency stay of the
compliance deadline requested by Nucla Station after the Court's remand
without vacatur. 285 Here, the D.C. Circuit said that a stay was not needed since
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EPA was "on track" to complete an assessment of the costs of MATS by April
15, 2016.286 With this date, it is possible but not likely that EPA will complete
its analysis before Nucla Station's deadline for compliance with MATS. 2 87
However, the D.C. Circuit's decision to enforce the MATS regulatory
deadlines on remand does not offer an adequate remedy for Nucla Station and
other similarly affected facilities. Even though EPA may be able to complete the
mandated cost assessment before the compliance deadline, it is unlikely that the
D.C. Circuit will make its final determination on the fate of the MATS before
April 15, 2016. In the meantime, facilities that have not yet complied with the
MATS will have to decide whether to invest in the equipment needed to comply
or shut down, and such decisions usually require years of planning. 288 Power
plants in particular must plan ahead, and so a last-minute court decision will not
leave facilities with enough time to comply.
The Clean Air Act imposes penalties on facilities that are unable to meet
regulatory standards: operators that emit HAPs may be subject to administrative
fines and to civil penalties 2 89 along with and criminal sanctions under the Clean
Air Act's endangerment provision. 29 0 Also, private citizens may bring civil suits
against any person who violates an emission standard or against the EPA for
failure to enforce a provision of the Clean Air Act. 2 9 1 Courts have allowed EPA
to use regulatory discretion in enforcing some policies. 2 92 A similar concept,
called enforcement discretion, allows agencies to work cooperatively with
violators in order to obtain compliance using methods of persuasion rather than
monetary penalties. 2 93 Allowing enforcement discretion for violations based on
rules on remand without vacatur could provide relief for affected facilities. But
enforcement discretion alone is not enough because it would not protect facilities
from citizen suits and would not give the regulated facilities any certainty about
whether or when EPA would enforce penalties.
Thus, courts should consider allowing additional time for industries that
face uncertainty while the governing regulations are under review. The AlliedSignal analysis model with inclusion of costs to the regulated community would
provide an appropriate framework for determining when a stay of a regulatory
deadline is appropriate during the remand without vacatur period. Under this
analysis, when the regulation has serious deficiencies (such as costs that
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outweigh the benefits) and keeping the regulation in force has disruptive
consequences, the court must allow more time.
Finally, this Note urges the court to consider whether a stay of compliance
deadlines is appropriate earlier in the process of legal challenges to avoid
moomess for the larger regulated community.
When regulations impose
significant costs or call for expansion of an agency's regulatory reach, as did the
Clean Power Plan, earlier consideration of a stay is appropriate. This did not
happen for the MATS. Thus, a determination made immediately following the
ruling in Michigan would not have avoided the present situation because the
compliance deadline preceded the Court's decision. Though some may argue
that delayed deadlines would be a disincentive -- justifying environmental
compliance that lags behind others in the same industry -- it would not excuse
plants from complying with regulations after the agency has corrected the errors
that led to remand without vacatur. Instead, it would give the regulated
community the time it needs to develop compliance plans that balance EPA
mandated environmental protections with required cost-efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION

Despite EPA's efforts to downplay the decision, Michigan heralds an
important shift in the Supreme Court's application of Chevron deference.
Although the decision in Michigan came too late for most oil- and coal-fired
power plants, it was not too late for facilities like Nucla Station. Even though
the court chose not to grant relief for that particular facility, Nucla Station stands
as an example of the difficulties industries face when they are regulated under
rules whose future "rests on thin air."
The Michigan Court has spoken regarding the mandate of upfront cost
consideration. It is clear after Michigan, that courts will not allow agencies to
ignore the costs of significant new regulations under Chevron analysis. Yet no
court has addressed this gap -- regulations under remand without vacatur
adversely affect the facilities subject to them. Incorporating costs to the
regulated community in an Allied-Signal analysis is a logical way to achieve this
result, particularly for rules that are costly and controversial. This will become
even more important as litigation of the Clean Power Plan progresses. 294 To
ignore the effects of uncertainty during judicial review of Clean Air Act
regulations is not only imprudent, but will be detrimental to the power industry's
ability to provide its rate payers with a cost-effective source of power.
Some believe that the regulated community is so entrenched in EPA's
rulemaking process, that environmental rules are usually in industry's favor at
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the expense of public health. As of late however, this trend is changingevidenced by the Court's holding in Michigan. As a result, courts are tightening
deference afforded to the EPA. 295 In the uncertainty that follows remand
without vacatur, a stay of compliance deadlines strikes the appropriate balance
between protecting the environment and regulating power plants in a costeffective manner.

295. Justice Antonin Scalia, upon his death on February 13, 2016, left an important legacy in
environmental law. In his absence, there is significant uncertainty about the future of pending environmental
cases.
See, e.g., Dan Farber, Justice Scalia and Environmental Law, Feb. 15, 2016, http://legalplanet.org/2016/02/15/justice-scalia-and-environmental-law/.

